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ABSTRACT
This article shows how the network structure of economic expertise can
inﬂuence the diﬀusion of ideas in economic policymaking. Applying social
network analysis, we analyse the networks of economic policy advice in the
United States and Germany around the Council of Economic Advisors and the
Sachverständigenrat. With the help of co-publication and institutional
aﬃliation data, we argue that the more fragmented structure of academic
expertise in Germany hindered the diﬀusion of new ideas and fostered
continuity in the austerity paradigm. In contrast, the more connected
structure of economic expertise in the United States facilitated the diﬀusion of
ideas and changes in dominant ideas about economic intervention.
KEYWORDS Economic expertise; social network analysis; Council of Economic Advisors (United States);
Council of Economic Experts (Germany)
Introduction
The crisis that hit the world economy in 2008 led to a new battle of economic
ideas. Following decades of an apparent consensus around free markets and
light-touch regulation as blueprints for economic policy, Keynesian ideas
calling for active state intervention to counter the crisis made a surprising
comeback, albeit a short-lived one (Blyth 2013; Farrell and Quiggin 2016). Pro-
minent economic experts who were supposedly part of the neoclassical con-
sensus seemed to now support active state intervention as an appropriate
response to the Great Recession (Uchitelle 2009). An interesting feature of
these debates was how quickly this new apparent consensus around state
intervention emerged and then collapsed, and how diﬀerent these patterns
of adoption seemed to be across countries.
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In the United States and within a number of international organisations,
economic experts seemed to widely adhere to the idea that ﬁscal stimulus
was an appropriate tool for solving the crisis. In Germany, in contrast,
leading economic experts only timidly supported state intervention to
counter the downturn. The main economic advisory body, the German
Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der
gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung - SVR) was much more reluctant to
abandon the supply-side paradigm than its equivalent in the United States,
the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) (Farrell and Quiggin 2016: 2; Fricke
2017: 5–6). How can we understand these divergent patterns?
A vast body of literature has now analysed change and resilience in econ-
omic policy ideas over time and space (e.g., Blyth 2002; Hall 1989, 1993;
Schmidt and Thatcher 2014). Recent research has focused on a number of
factors to explain why dominant economic ideas change or persist, such as
the generalisability and ﬂexibility of ideas, the extent to which they can be
mobilised only as rhetoric, their argumentative power among the public,
the interests that certain ideas defend, and the institutional structures
which can be more or less favourable to certain ideas (see Schmidt and
Thatcher [2014] for a review). Recently, Farrell and Quiggin (2016) proposed
a promising framework to explain how consensus and dissensus among econ-
omic experts shape their inﬂuence in policymaking, and how dominant ideas
in policymaking are replaced. However, so far we only have a limited under-
standing of the factors that shape how consensus and dissensus emerge
among economic experts (Farrell and Quiggin 2016: 3).
In this article, we focus on an overlooked factor, namely the social organ-
isation of economic expertise in the form of social networks between econ-
omists. More precisely, we show how the diﬀerent network structures of
academic economic expertise in Germany and the United States, around
the German Council of Economic Experts and the US Council of Economic
Advisers respectively, could shape the diﬀusion of ideas about stimulus and
austerity. We show that the incomplete conversion of German economic
experts to Keynesian ideas coincides with a more fragmented social
network which makes it more diﬃcult for ideas to diﬀuse within the pro-
fession. In the United States, meanwhile, a more integrated social network
could facilitate the diﬀusion of ideas and the emergence of a more wide-
spread consensus in favour of economic intervention. To assess this argu-
ment, we combine tools from social network analysis, comparative political
economy and the sociology of science to draw insights into the process of
idea diﬀusion and inﬂuence.
Our study draws on two ﬁelds. The ﬁrst deals with the role of ideas and
economic expertise in shaping public policies. In comparative and inter-
national political economy, this ﬁeld has focused on the genesis, change
and resilience of ideas about economic governance (Ban 2016; Blyth 2002,
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2013; Castensen 2011; Dellepiane 2015; Farrell and Quiggin 2016; Fourcade
2010; Hirschmann and Berman 2014; Schmidt and Thatcher 2014). By using
tools of social network analysis, our study delves into the structural basis for
the emergence of consensus and conﬂict, starting from the idea that the inter-
connectedness of economists advising governments shapes the ability of
economic ideas to diﬀuse. We contribute to an expanding body of research
using this methodology to analyse the diﬀusion of ideas in international pol-
itical economy (Ban 2016; Helgadottir 2016). However, in contrast to existing
works, which usually look at one (transnational) network at a time, we adopt a
comparative approach and seek to show how variation in network structures
can shape idea diﬀusion. In doing so, we connect to the literature on ‘knowl-
edge regimes’, highlighting more comparatively the diﬀerent ways whereby
policy ideas are created and diﬀused across countries (Campbell and Pedersen
2014). Here, we focus on a smaller subset of actors (actors tied to a formal
council of economic advisors) rather than the broader set of knowledge-pro-
duction organisations (think tanks, etc.) constituting a knowledge regime.
The second strand we draw on looks at diﬀusion within social networks,
considering how diﬀerent network topologies can facilitate or hinder the
diﬀusion of ideas, information or behaviours (Centola 2010, 2015; Granovetter
1973; Newman 2010). So far, this literature focussing on variation in network
typology has looked at social diﬀusion processes in a wide variety of settings,
but not between experts and/or policymakers (Centola 2010, 2015). Using a
comparative approach, we seek to assess in the real world whether the mech-
anisms highlighted in controlled experiments or simulations can provide
some insights into policymaking. Obviously, observational data come with
many limitations in terms of measurement and inference compared to exper-
imental data, but we believe that this approach can pave the way for a prom-
ising research agenda linking macro-patterns of ideational change (e.g., Peter
Hall’s [1993] policy paradigms) and micro-assumptions about how ideas and
information diﬀuse among individuals (e.g., Granovetter’s (1973) strength of
weak ties).
In this paper, we seek to draw insights from the latter strand of literature to
improve the former. First, some approaches that focus on ideas, such as policy
paradigms, do so without paying much attention to the social structure in
which they are embedded. We start from the assumption that economic
ideas, whatever their intrinsic characteristics, require social channels to
diﬀuse, and we endeavour to uncover how the shape of these channels can
facilitate or hinder the emergence of expert consensus, which in turn inﬂu-
ences the ability of experts to inﬂuence policymaking.
In the following sections, we provide an overview of the literature on idea-
tional change in economic policymaking and how a focus on network top-
ology can improve it. Our empirical analysis is conducted in two steps: ﬁrst,
we qualitatively assess variation in the patterns of consensus and dissensus
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among economic experts in the United States and Germany. Second, we
deploy tools of social network analysis to map networks of economic policy
expertise in the two countries, before discussing some caveats and avenues
for further research.
Ideational change and resilience in economic policymaking
The analysis of ideas and expertise in economic policymaking has now been
the focus of a vast body of literature (Blyth [2002]; Christensen [2017]; Hall
[1993], among others). Diﬀerent approaches emphasise diﬀerent factors to
account for resilience and change in dominant ideas. Hall’s (1993) pathbreak-
ing analysis of economic policymaking in Britain was extremely inﬂuential in
popularising the idea of policy paradigms as ‘frameworks of ideas and stan-
dards that specify not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments
that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems
they are meant to be addressing’. The basic assumption of this approach
was that economic policymaking could not be derived exclusively from
actors’ interests or institutions, especially in times of uncertainty such as
large economic crises, but had to rely on ‘cognitive maps’ of the world
which could provide insights into the causes of economic problems and
how to solve them. In Hall’s perspective, the trigger of ideational change
was the appearance of ‘anomalies’ in the paradigm, or the appearance of
facts that could not be explained within the existing paradigm. Change was
mostly driven by exogenous factors and characterised by long phases of stab-
ility alternating with brief periods of radical change. Hall’s original approach
provided little focus on actors as agents of change and assumed that, in
line with Kuhn’s study of science, change happened through revolutions.
Moreover, it did not consider that actors may not completely adhere to it (Car-
stensen 2011). Blyth (2002) adopts a fairly similar approach to Hall with regard
to punctuated equilibrium but puts greater emphasis on agency and the
battle of ideas in times of crises (for a synthesis, see Blyth [2013]).
While Hall and Blyth looked primarily at ideational change, a more recent
strand of literature has looked at ideational resilience, namely how liberal
ideas about economic governance have maintained their primacy even fol-
lowing the global ﬁnancial crisis. This can be considered a puzzle in Hall’s fra-
mework since ‘anomalies’ did not lead to paradigm change (Schmidt and
Thatcher 2014). Schmidt and Thatcher emphasise a number of factors
which can account for why certain ideas persist despite radical changes in
their environment. They highlight the plasticity of (liberal) ideas which
makes them more adaptable to changes in the environment, the diﬃculty
of actually assessing their eﬀectiveness because they are essentially rhetorical,
the ‘common sense’ nature of some of these ideas (e.g., that one should not
spend more than one earns), the interests of powerful actors in maintaining
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certain dominant ideas, and the nature of institutions in hindering or favour-
ing certain economic policy ideas.
A connected strand of literature focusing more on the actors rather than
the ideas has focused on economic expertise, with a focus on how the author-
itative specialist knowledge of a speciﬁc group of actors (economists) can
shape their inﬂuence over policymaking (Christensen 2017). The most inﬂuen-
tial approach of the role of expertise in international politics was Haas’s (1992)
concept of ‘epistemic communities’. While Haas understood professional con-
sensus to be the norm within expert communities, other research has started
to look at the ﬁeld of expertise as a space of conﬂict between actors proposing
diﬀerent policy alternatives. This is notably the case of recent research in com-
parative and international political economy, which focusses on economic
expertise as a relatively autonomous organisational ﬁeld partly closed to
the outside (Campbell and Pedersen 2014: 3). This strand of research explains
how alliances between experts, politicians and bureaucrats shape policies, or
focusses on the internal structure of professions and academic ﬁelds. In this
perspective, ideational change may happen not only because of transform-
ations in the external environment, as assumed by Hall, but also endogen-
ously, as a result of the evolution and diﬀusion of new ideas within expert
communities.
In a recent paper, Farrell andQuiggin (2016) highlight howprofessional con-
sensus and dissensus have shaped the inﬂuence of economists in policymak-
ing. They show that it may be easier for expert communities characterised by
consensus to inﬂuence policymakers, while dissensus tends to weaken this
inﬂuence because it allows policymakers to pick and choose the experts who
support their particular policy agenda. Recent research in international political
economyuses tools of social network analysis to highlight howexperts are con-
nected and how ideas can therefore diﬀuse, shaping the ability of experts to
form a consensus and thereby inﬂuence policymaking. The basic premise of
these studies is that the diﬀusion of ideas and norms about policymaking
happens through social connections between actors, either through organis-
ational aﬃliations (in universities or think tanks, expert committees, inter-
national organisations), co-authorships or citations (Ban 2016; Helgadottir
2016). In this paper, we draw on these studies to analyse how the typology
of expert networks can shape idea diﬀusion. Farrell and Quiggin convincingly
show how ecologies matter and how consensus and dissensus shape the
policy inﬂuence of experts. For their part, Ban (2016) and Helgadottir (2016)
make use of formal social network analysis to show how social connections
can act as channels for ideas to diﬀuse. However, these approaches do not
show how variation in the organisation of networks may shape the ability of
ideas to diﬀuse among experts and mediate the reception of ideas. This is an
important gap because Campbell and Pedersen (2014: 3–4) have shown that
diﬀerent ‘knowledge regimes’ – the way the production of economic policy
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ideas is organised across countries – have acted as important ﬁlters for the
reception of neoliberal ideas across countries.
We build on this idea but operationalise these national diﬀerences as
diﬀerent network topologies – that is, diﬀerent ways economic experts are
connected to each other and to the broader economic profession. To under-
stand how diﬀerent types of networks shape the circulation of ideas, we turn
to the literature in sociology and physics to examine the impact of network
topologies on the diﬀusion of social phenomena.
Network topology and idea diﬀusion
Ideas, information and behaviours spread through populations via social con-
tacts (Centola 2010: 1194; Granovetter 1973). Many political and social beha-
viours are believed to be shaped by individuals’ social networks of colleagues
and friends (Abrams et al. 2011). Similarly, expert consensus and adherence to
a speciﬁc set of economic policy ideas can be assumed to take place through
social contacts between experts, for instance via joint research work, attend-
ance of the same doctoral programmes or membership in the same organis-
ations. Van Gunten et al. (2016: 1045) show for instance that economists close
to one another in co-authorship networks tend to share similar latent ideol-
ogies. Of course, causality can go both ways: experts may share social ties
because they share particular ideas, rather than the other way around.
However, it is reasonable to assume that ties that exist within expert networks
precede ideological aﬃnities and are not deﬁned by them: people may attend
the same elite graduate programmes in economics because of the quality of
their education and the professional prospects they oﬀer, and not necessarily
because of their ideological orientation.
Based on this idea, the topology of the network in which experts are
embedded can have an important inﬂuence on the ability of ideas to
spread and of consensus to emerge around a set of ideas. In the speciﬁc
context of economic expertise, the structure of the expert network can be
shaped by the propensity of experts to co-author publications, to have
attended the same universities, or to be members of the same organisations,
which in turn is shaped by the institutional setting, or ‘knowledge regime’
(Campbell and Pedersen 2014). The number, nature and density of these
links can vary signiﬁcantly across countries. If one focuses on academia as a
relevant subset of the ‘knowledge regime’, for instance, the United States
seems to have a much more centralised and hierarchical academic system
than most European countries, as well as more widely accepted prestige hier-
archies: elite institutions essentially recruit graduates from other elite insti-
tutions, whereas less prestigious institutions seek to recruit graduates from
elite institutions. As a result, the ‘centralized and highly connected positions
of higher-prestige institutions enable substantial inﬂuence, via doctoral
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placement, over the research agendas, research communities, and depart-
mental norms throughout a discipline’ (Clauset et al. 2015: 4; see also Burris
[2004]). In contrast, such a clear hierarchy is diﬃcult to ﬁnd in continental
European countries, where knowledge production within academia is less
centralised and less uniform (Afonso 2016).
If network structure inﬂuences the way ideas diﬀuse, which type of network
topology is most prone to idea diﬀusion? There are two competing hypoth-
eses about how the typology of networks can shape the diﬀusion of ideas
and behaviour. The ﬁrst hypothesis, drawn from the physics and epidemiol-
ogy literature, assumes that ideas diﬀuse like diseases: a single exposure to
an ‘infected’ source of ideas will spread the idea further. In this perspective,
centralised networks with many long ties seem to be the most prone to
rapid diﬀusion, which leads to the most complete pattern of contagion
(Newman 2010). Hence, one central actor connected to all the other actors
in a network should lead to a complete pattern of contagion. This idea
relates to what Granovetter (1973) showed in his seminal work on the
strength of weak ties: actors with weak ties outside their immediate circle
have better access to information. Such ‘long ties’ reduce the number of
steps necessary to diﬀuse through diﬀerent parts of a network and should
therefore help ideas and behaviour spread more quickly and completely
(Centola 2010: 1194). In general, networks with higher densities should
favour more contacts between actors and a more complete diﬀusion of
ideas. More densely connected networks notably provide a larger number
of possible paths between nodes, thereby reducing the ability of nodal
actors to block the ﬂow of ideas. In an article also using simulations, Sueur
et al. (2012) show that decentralised networks are less likely to create a con-
sensus around common norms than centralised networks.
The second hypothesis discussed in the literature which links network top-
ology with diﬀusion assumes that beliefs and social behaviours are diﬀerent
from infectious diseases. For individuals to adopt a particular set of ideas,
they must receive reinforcement from multiple sources and observe that
many actors close to them have already adopted a set of ideas before they
adopt it themselves (Centola 2010: 1194). This requires a diﬀerent type of
network topology. Namely, networks clustered into distinct cliques should
be more favourable to the spread of belief systems because each clique
works as an ‘incubation box’ for ideas to convince actors and spread
further. This is notably what Centola (2010) found in his study of the spread
on health behaviour online, which showed that clustered networks with
only ‘short ties’ spread social norms faster and farther than random networks
characterised by many long ties. However, it should be mentioned that these
works do not assume any predetermined hierarchy between nodes, which
does not seem to be a realistic assumption when analysing expert networks.
Indeed, previous research has shown that the global economist network is an
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emerging ‘small world’ – that is, there is a low average path length compared
to the scale of the network with a clear hierarchical structure where individual
‘star’ economists have great inﬂuence (Goyal et al. 2004). Algan et al. (2015)
come to a similar conclusion while looking at the economics profession.
Nevertheless, it is worth assessing these two hypotheses in conjunction: can
diﬀerent levels of receptiveness to new economic policy ideas be linked to
diﬀerent network structures?
Methods and cases
In this article, we compare Germany and the United States, the two largest
economies in Europe and North America respectively, whose economic pol-
icies shape the world economy far beyond their borders. Each country pos-
sesses an oﬃcial advisory body of experts to advise the government on
economic matters (Farrell and Quiggin 2016; Wallich 1968).
Our empirical analysis consists of two parts. First, to measure our depen-
dent variable, we qualitatively assess dissensus and consensus among econ-
omic experts in Germany and in the United States, looking at their position
towards Keynesian ideas – more precisely the use of ﬁscal policy to stabilise
the economy during recessions. Regarding consensus and dissensus, we
look in particular at the policies supported by the economics profession as
a whole in both countries (using surveys of the economics profession in
both countries)1 and those advocated by the two advisory bodies we focus
on, using their publications, opinions voiced in the press and secondary
literature.
The second part of our analysis consists in an exploratory social network
analysis (SNA) in which we compare the structure of the networks around
the SVR and the CEA in Germany and the United States, respectively, in
order to assess whether diﬀerent levels of consensus and dissensus can be
linked to diﬀerent social network structures. For our social network analysis,
we use 2-mode, or aﬃliation, networks in which each node represents
either an economist or an institution (Faust, 1997). Our actors are the econom-
ists, and our subsets consist of economic organisations. We consider two
types of ties in building our networks, namely co-authorship (economists-
economists) and institutional aﬃliations (economists-organisations), bearing
in mind that these are of course imperfect proxies for channels of contact
between economic experts. Co-authorship and institutional aﬃliations never-
theless provide a feasible and systematic source of measurement used by
other researchers in this area (Ban 2016; Beyer et al. 2017; Helgadóttir 2016;
Pühringer 2016). The co-publication data were extracted from the Web of
Science database with the help of the ‘Science of Science’ (Sci2) tool (Sci2
Team, 2009), and the data on institutional aﬃliations was extracted from
the Research Papers in Economics (RePEc) database (Federal Reserve Bank
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of St. Louis). For the visualisation and analysis, we used the software Gephi
(Mathieu, Heymann, and Jacomy, 2009).
As a starting point, the analysis focuses on members of the CEA and SVR
from 2005 to 2015.2 In the United States, we also included the academic
members of the Presidential Economic Recovery and Advisory Board
(PERAB), which was created by President Barack Obama in response to the
crisis.
Starting with these initial economists,3 we construct two 2-mode networks
of economic policy advice. For each country, we added the 10 most academi-
cally inﬂuential economic institutions according to the ranking provided by
the IDEAS website, which is part of the RePEc database (Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis). For Germany, these institutions include think tanks, the
European Central Bank, the Bundesbank and university departments. For
the US, besides the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the
Federal Reserve Board and the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER), only university departments made the top ten. The World Bank and
the IMF, however, had to be replaced. Although they are based in the US,
their economists are recruited worldwide, and only three economists in the
network map were aﬃliated with either one of them.
Economic expertise in the United States and Germany:
resilience and change
In this article, we focus on the German SVR and the US CEA as the two central
advisory committees in charge of providing economic advice to their respect-
ive governments (Campbell and Pedersen 2014; Wallich 1968). This compari-
son needs to take into account the diﬀerent institutional setups of these two
advisory committees. The most important aspect is that the CEA is part of the
federal administration and appointed by the president (Campbell and Peder-
sen 2014: 299), while the SVR is formally an independent body which appoints
its own chair (Campbell and Pedersen 2014: 299, 139; Wallich 1968: 349). This
institutional setup allows for greater levels of partisan inﬂuence in the United
States. Campbell and Pedersen (2014: 299ﬀ) also found lower levels of consist-
ency in economic ideas in the United States than in Germany, with more ‘ﬂip
ﬂopping’ in the United States.4 This potential source of bias will be discussed
later.
Looking at the whole population of economists in the two countries (Figure
1), we can observe diﬀerences in attitudes towards state intervention, but also
convergent developments in the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis (Beyer et al. 2017).
First, US economists have tended to be more supportive of the use of ﬁscal
policy tools to stabilise the economy prior to the crisis. The time span
measured diﬀers, but in 2006, 28.8% of German economists disagreed with
the idea that ﬁscal policy was an eﬀective tool, while only 13% of US
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 9
economists disagreed in 2000. After the crisis broke out, however, in both
countries there was a clear increase in support for ﬁscal policy as a tool to
stabilise the economy. This is interesting because the widespread idea that
German economists as a whole are hostile to state intervention is not
conﬁrmed, echoing other research arguing that German economic thinking
is not only much less homogeneous and orthodox than commonly
assumed, but also that there is considerable ﬂexibility within the ordo-
liberal paradigm (Jacoby 2015).
However, there may be a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the total popu-
lation of academic economists and those actually providing advice to govern-
ments on matters of economic policy. Indeed, we can observe a stark contrast
between the type of advice provided by the CEA and the SVR in the wake of
the crisis.
In the United States, the CEA was an active voice in favour of ﬁscal stimulus
(Farrell and Quiggin 2016: 7). It issued a number of reports advocating for and
justifying programmes of government spending to combat the crisis. This
echoed a broader movement within the discipline, which seemed to be wit-
nessing a quick conversion of mainstream economists towards government
spending. The meeting of the American Economic Association in 2009, for
instance, demonstrated the rediscovery of discretionary spending by the
economics profession (Uchitelle 2009). In the United States, the ﬁnancial
crisis corresponded with the arrival of a new Democratic administration and
0
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Figure 1. Survey responses to the statement “Fiscal policy is an eﬀective tool to stabilise
the economy”. Own elaboration based on data by Fricke (2017), Fuller and Geide-Steven-
son (2014), IGM (2014).
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a CEA composed of people with already favourable ideas towards ﬁscal stimu-
lus, or who had been converted by the crisis. The most prominent example
was its involvement in the design and evaluation of the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). In its third assessment report, the CEA noted
for instance that the ARRA had created between 2.2 and 2.6 million jobs.5
In contrast, German economic experts within the SVR were much less
receptive to new ideas about economic stimulus. This is interesting
because, as shown above, within the broader economics profession, one
could observe a marked shift towards more support for ﬁscal policy activism
to ﬁght the crisis. In spite of this, the SVR only reluctantly supported a counter-
cyclical policy in late 2008, at a time when stimulus packages were already
under way elsewhere. Moreover, it seems that SVR members did not
change their ideational framework, but adapted it to ﬁt the new reality. The
new argument was that state failure in the US due to easy lending of the
Federal Reserve caused the crisis and that this exceptional circumstance
allowed for the stimulus, which should then be quickly followed up by
ﬁscal consolidation, debt brakes and stronger rules.6 More broadly, prominent
German economists, such as Hans-Werner Sinn from the WIFO institute in
Munich, actively opposed the intervention of the European Central Bank in
ﬁnancial markets to counter the crisis. Axel Weber, a former member of the
SVR and Head of the Bundesbank, resigned in protest of the ECB’s active
bond-buying programme while he was a leading candidate to become the
next ECB president. The SVR brieﬂy supported a ﬁscal stimulus – while simul-
taneously putting its eﬃcacy in doubt – and came quickly back to ﬁscal ortho-
doxy as a leading principle for economic policies (Sachverständigenrat 2010).
This was demonstrated by its 2014–2015 report entitled ‘More Conﬁdence in
Market Processes’ (Sachverständigenrat 2015). In the report, the SVR criticised
the ECB’s intervention to buy government bonds, defended Germany’s
budget surpluses and opposed what it called ‘action-ism’, criticised the intro-
duction of a minimum wage, cast doubt on the idea that inequalities had
increased, and advised against increasing public investment (Fricke 2017:
6–7; 51–52). These and similar instances even led long-time SVR member
Peter Boﬁnger to lament, ‘no matter what the topic, it’s four to one against
me,’ adding ‘I’m the last Keynesian – and I feel like the last Mohican’ (Econom-
ist 2015). These examples of the strong entrenchment of non-interventionist
economic ideas make the short concession of the SVR towards ﬁscal stimulus
in late 2008 surprising.
The network structure of economic expertise
An interesting diﬀerence between US and German economic expertise is the
stark diﬀerence between the positions of the CEA and the SVR in spite of the
fact that general opinions about economic intervention within the economic
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profession as a whole have evolved in similar directions in both countries,
albeit somewhat protractedly in Germany. While we see a correspondence
(or relative consensus) between the economics profession and the govern-
ment’s advisory body in the United States, we see a relative disjuncture (or dis-
sensus) between economic advice and the economics profession in Germany.
While this could be attributed to partisan diﬀerences, or party-driven pat-
terns of selection of the experts on these advisory bodies, the fact that the SVR
has a considerable degree of autonomy seems to go against this conclusion.
Can these diﬀerent positions be linked to a diﬀerent network structure that
allowed ordo-liberal ideas to stay in important nodal positions? If our hypoth-
esis about the network determinants of consensus is correct, we should
observe a more centralised and connected structure of economic expertise
in the United States, while in Germany we would expect a network fragmen-
ted in distant clusters that could impede a complete diﬀusion of ideas. Analys-
ing the two networks of economists separately can give us insights into
diﬀerent diﬀusion patterns of economic ideas. We analyse this by comparing
the ease of interaction within both networks through indicators such as
average path length, network density, degree distribution modularity and
clustering. Below, Table 1 presents comparative statistics on our two
networks.
The two constructed 2-mode networks are NA= (n1,… ,n404) and NG= (n1,
… ,n184). The American network, NA, has 966 edges, while its German
counterpart, NG, has 338 edges. A node, n, can be either an academic insti-
tution, na, or an economic institution ni. Each co-publication between two
economists is weighted as 1 and each additional co-publication is added on
top of that, indicating a stronger connection. Institutional aﬃliation is
always weighted as 1. The maximum edge weight is 25 in NA and 7 in NG.
The average weighted degree is higher in NA, indicating a higher tendency
to co-publish in the United States.
We have 15 distinct communities in NA and 9 in NG. In Germany, these com-
munities represent all the SVR members but Bert Rurüp, who does not have
enough connections on his own and therefore shares a community with
Table 1. Comparison of the German and US economists’ 2-mode networks.
NA NG Diﬀerence (NA− NG)
∑ na,i 404 184 220
∑ g 966 338 628
Ø degree 4782 3674 1,108
Ø weighted degree 6.713 5.174 1.539
Network diameter 15 9 6
Number of communities 7 8 −1
Ø path length 3.371 3.547 −0.176
Graph density 0.012 0.02 −0.008
Network modularity 0.714 0.776 −0.062
Ø clustering coeﬃcient 0.655 0.680 −0.025
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the SVR. Peter Boﬁnger7 and Isabel Schnabel each have very small commu-
nities and are close to sharing one with the SVR as well.
In NA, we see more connections between the diﬀerent advisers, causing
many to share communities and therefore be better linked not only via the
CEA but also to other economists and institutions. Overall, this puts NA
further on its way to be a fully connected network. NA’s structure also has hier-
archic tendencies, as ascertained by previous research on the economic pro-
fession and expressed as ‘the tight management of the discipline from the top
down’ (Algan et al. 2015: 2; Beyer et al. 2017; Goyal et al. 2004). We can see this
centralisation in the apparent dominance of the community which occupies
parts of the network’s centre and combines with the NBER and Harvard Uni-
versity, two important institutions of idea dissemination. The CEA is also close
to this community.
Because of the way we built our networks, we would have suspected an
even stronger tendency towards star formations around the initial econom-
ists. While visually this is certainly the case (especially in NG), we ﬁnd the
overall average clustering coeﬃcient to be closer to one than zero, which indi-
cates some level of cliquishness. However, most of the initial economists have
a local clustering coeﬃcient close to zero, which is shown in star formations
around them. The unexpected high average clustering coeﬃcient is caused
in part by the tendency of many economists to publish in groups of three
or more, which leads our networks to have many triangles (Total triangles
NA = 745; NG= 161). This gives the majority of economists who do not have
any further connections a clustering coeﬃcient of 1.0, which skews the
average. Overall, the networks in Figures 2 and 3 give the impression of a
system of interlinked stars with a high degree of clustering among them.
This star formation is also observable in the numbers, with the highest individ-
ual degree centrality being 14.6 (NA) and 9.8 (NG) times the average.
Mostly due to this lack of institutional interlinkage, communities are much
less interconnected in NG and therefore form separate islands. This indicates
that isolated German economists may have been less able to inﬂuence
German mainstream economics, given the reluctance of German mainstream
economists before the crisis to even consider ﬁscal stimulus as a viable policy
choice (Dullien 2008). Moreover, these isolated islands could have also been
instrumental in returning German politics so quickly to business as usual by
holding on to ﬁscally orthodox ideas and providing politicians with arguments
as soon as the uncertainty of the crisis receded from the network of econom-
ists. In line with the hypothesis that centralisation allows for more consensus,
a lack of centralisation may also allow for more diversity in ideas. Still, there is a
prevalence of a strong ordo-liberal paradigm as described by Pühringer (2016)
and shown in NG, where most of the ‘north’ can be counted as close to ordo-
liberal ideas, since the advisers Lars P. Feld, Wolfgang Franz and Volker
Wieland are members of ordo-liberal think tanks such as the Walter-Eucken
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Institut and the Kronberger Kreis. In contrast, the Keynesian ‘alternative’ is only
represented by Peter Boﬁnger.
Our 2-mode networks depict the structure of the economic profession in
both cases and show the importance of institutions as intermediaries,
especially for NA. However, for the analysis of network indicators, it was
necessary to transform our networks into 1-mode networks, since our soft-
ware cannot distinguish between the diﬀerent types of nodes. Therefore,
we transformed our networks into 1-mode networks (N′A and N′G) by convert-
ing intermediary links of institutions to direct links between academics. The
numbers of edges are therefore multiplied in the new networks by 5.2 for
N′A and by 1.4 for N′G. This has several other eﬀects on the networks, as
shown in Table 2.
Considering the relatively small average path length compared to the net-
works’ scale, both networks are close to what constitutes small worlds (more
Figure 2. Social network of German economists, institutions and main advisory body.
Note: Nodes are sized by eigenvector centrality, and the colour represent modularity class.
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so NA), which reﬂects Goyal et al.’s (2004) ﬁndings of the economic profession
being an emerging small world. Moreover, in terms of path length, we ﬁnd
that in N′A the average path is shorter by 0.149. The overall degree distribution
is similar in both cases (with most nodes having 3, 2 or 1 edges), however with
higher extremes in N′A and an overall higher average (weighted) degree. There-
fore, in terms of these indicators, we ﬁnd N′A to have higher connectivity.
For clustering8 and modularity,9 our results show a slightly lower average
clustering coeﬃcient (by 0.047), and a higher network modularity (by 0.37)
in N′G. These two indicators represent the division of the networks into separ-
ate communities. The former indicates that in Germany there is a stronger ten-
dency towards star formations and overall less interconnectedness between
Figure 3. Social network of US economists, institutions and main advisory bodies.
Note: Nodes are sized by eigenvector centrality, and the colour represents its modularity class.
Table 2. Comparison of the German and US economists’ 1-mode networks.
N′A N′G Diﬀerence (N′A− N′G)
∑ na 392 173 219
∑ g 5028 468 4560
Ø degree 25,653 5.41 20,871
Ø weighted degree 30.3723 7.064 23.308
Network diameter 4 3 1
Number of communities 7 8 −1
Ø path length 2.526 2.675 −0.149
Graph density 0.066 0.031 0.035
Network modularity 0.283 0.653 −0.37
Ø clustering coeﬃcient 0.866 0.819 0.047
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nodes, while the latter shows that in Germany economists are more divided
into communities and are well connected within the community but sparsely
connected to outsiders, thereby creating isolated islands. Lastly, graph density
points in the same direction. Despite the larger scale of N′A and thereby a
higher number of potential edges, N′A is shown to be further on its path
towards a fully connected network.
It is diﬃcult, if not impossible, to properly map the diﬀusion of ideas
throughout a network; however, our comparative approach shows that
the US economic profession is better connected, which may facilitate a
quicker diﬀusion of ideas and a more complete conversion, causing the
apparent Keynesian consensus described by Farrell and Quiggin (2016). In
contrast, the more fragmented nature of the German profession delayed
the emergence of a consensus on stimulus, while the importance of ordo-
liberal academics in nodal positions and the reinforcing nature of their sep-
arate islands hindered a full ideational change despite the uncertainty
created by the crisis.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have taken the ﬁrst steps into a previously unexplored
approach: comparing network structures of idea diﬀusion within communities
of economic experts. Our aim was to deepen our understanding of how econ-
omic ideas shape policymaking by looking at the ‘social infrastructure’ of
expertise. A comparison of social networks in two countries made it possible
to go beyond existing analyses in the ﬁeld, which usually looked at only one
network. Of course, it is clear that network topology is only one factor inﬂuen-
cing diﬀusion and consensus building; our network analysis was exploratory
and gave us limited insights into causality, as it is indeed diﬃcult to
observe ideas actually diﬀusing. It is therefore important to assess alternative
explanations and outline avenues for future research.
First, our analysis assumes a relatively high level of autonomy of the ﬁeld of
expertise. However, an idea can only be successful if it is able to attract
enough political support, which depends on the alliances struck between
experts, politicians and economic actors in ‘linked ecologies’ (Seabrooke
and Tsingou 2009). Future research should look not only at the social connec-
tions linking economic experts among themselves but also at the ways they
are tied to politicians and other stakeholders, possibly with diﬀerent types
of links than those that we measure here. In this respect, the diﬀerent insti-
tutional role of the two advisory bodies analysed here also entails diﬀerent
levels of independence: the SVR is formally more independent from govern-
ment than the CEA. While one could think that the greater support for stimu-
lus policies by the CEA may be a result of the greater political control held by
the Obama administration, we should also mention that activist policies had
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also been used at times by the George W. Bush administration, thereby ques-
tioning a systematic role of partisan inﬂuences.
Second, the added value of our approach was to adopt a comparative focus in
order to allow for a comparison of network topologies. This approach, however,
comes with a number of problems. As Algan et al. (2015) show, economics is
more globalised than many other academic disciplines, and looking at national
contexts may be problematic because ideas clearly cross national boundaries. In
this context, a growing body of scholarship has looked at the concept of trans-
lation, namely how actors convert economic paradigms into local contexts (e.g.,
Ban [2016]).
In the future, an analysis combining a comparative and transnational
approach that takes more into account the interaction between economic
advice and (local) politics would provide a clearer picture of how ideas
shape economic policymaking. An even more ambitious approach could
use dynamic networks and look more closely at the diﬀusion of ideas and
the timing of change. Such an approach would require a data collection
eﬀort and resources far beyond those employed in this article.
Notes
1. Unfortunately, there is no comparative data source which could allow us to track
the dominant view among economic experts in Germany and the United States
in a truly systematic manner. Hence, we draw on separate surveys conducted by
Fricke (2017) for Germany and Fuller and Geide-Stevenson (2014) for the United
States, as well as a qualitative assessment of opinions expressed publicly in the
press. It must be speciﬁed that these surveys cover the whole economics pro-
fession and not the subset of economists involved in some way in policy advice.
2. In the US they are Jason Furman, Sandra E. Black, Jay Shambaugh, Austan
D. Goolsbee, Cecilia E. Rouse, Christina D. Romer, Donald B. Marron, Edward
P. Lazear, Carl Shapiro, Katherine G. Abraham, Alan B. Krueger, James H. Stock,
Betsey Stevenson, Maurice Obstfeld, Katherine Baicker, Matthew J. Slaughter,
Ben S. Bernanke, Harvey S. Rosen, Kristin J. Forbes and N. Gregory Mankiw,
and in Germany they are Christoph M. Schmidt, Peter Boﬁnger, Lars P. Feld,
Isabel Schnabel, Volker Wieland, Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Bert Rürup, Wolfgang
Franz and Claudia M. Buch.
3. The network visualisations we present include more advisers in the surveyed
period than the number of seats, because membership in the CEA and the
SVR changes over time. In the German case, there are 10 instead of the
regular ﬁve advisers; in the US case, there are 20 (24 with PERAB) instead of
three. Higher turnover rates in the US explain this diﬀerence.
4. Wallich (1968: 349) had already noted that ‘The CEA has long been a reliable
spokesman for successive administrations. The SVR has been, with rare excep-
tions, a vigorous critic of the government in power’.
5. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2010/04/14/council-economic-
advisers-releases-a-new-report-recovery-act
6. In their 2008/09 annual report, while criticizing the ﬁrst German stimulus
package for not being ambitious enough, the SVR argued that the market
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paradigm should not be questioned and that Germany should return as soon as
possible to its path of ﬁscal consolidation. Following suit, in their 2009/10 report,
the experts criticize the government’s plans for tax cuts.
7. Peter Boﬁnger is the member of the SVR nominated by the trade unions (one
member is always proposed by the trade unions and one by industry associ-
ations) and the only SVR member who is associated with Keynesianism.
8. The clustering coeﬃcient ranges between zero and one. A node with a coeﬃ-
cient of zero would resemble a star, since its neighbours would not be intercon-
nected with each other; at one, we have a clique where each of the node’s
neighbours is connected with each other.
9. Networks with high modularity have dense connections between nodes within
modules but sparse connections to nodes outside the module.
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